

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON COVID-19**6 MAY 2020****DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION AGENCY**

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*Senate Select Committee on COVID-19***OPENING STATEMENT**

Thank you for the invitation to address the committee in relation to the Digital Transformation Agency's involvement in responding to the coronavirus pandemic.

Since early March, the DTA has been working on a number of fronts to support the Government's public communication and public health measures.

Firstly, we have led the development of a suite of new digital channels and services that have made it easier for the Australian community to access information on COVID-19.

We are responsible for the australia.gov.au website which consolidates in one place all the essential information and advice from across the Australian Government, as well as the states and territories.

This includes up to date health information as well as advice on the financial and social supports available to people.

As of this morning, there have been 9.7 million unique visitors since go-live, making up 16.9 million total visits.

We also worked with the Department of Health on the development of the Coronavirus Australia App and WhatsApp channel to enable the flow of information to the community.

The Coronavirus Australia App has been downloaded 3.54 million times and over 14.5 million messages have been sent and received through the WhatsApp channel.

Secondly, we have worked very closely with the Department of Health and the Attorney-General's Department on the rapid development of the COVIDSafe App to support contact tracing.

The COVIDSafe App uses digital technology to make it faster and easier for state and territory health officials to contact people who have been exposed to someone who has had a positive diagnosis of COVID-19. Its purpose is to help control the spread of infection in the community.

OPENING STATEMENT

OFFICIAL

We have worked with our colleagues in Health and the Attorney Generals' department to adopt a privacy by design approach to ensure robust technical, data governance and legal protections are in place.

As of this morning, 5,086,284 Australians have registered for the COVIDSafe App. The App is being constantly improved and the community will receive updates on a regular basis.

Thirdly, the DTA has also been supporting APS agencies with the rapid and widespread shift to remote working. During March and April in excess of 500 requests were processed through our Digital Sourcing Panels to equip agencies with the relevant technology capabilities for the disruptive period ahead.

For a small agency of around 250 people, we have been giving our all to make sure that the Australian community, and the Australian Public Service, are able to access digital services, tools and advice that helps them during this challenging period.

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OFFICIAL

Senate Select Committee on COVID-19

KEY TOPICS

Hosting and sovereign risk, and security

- All information collected and used by the COVIDSafe App and its ecosystem is stored on Australian-based cloud infrastructure.
- The infrastructure is owned and operated by Amazon Web Services (AWS).
- Under the terms of the contract between AWS and the DTA, AWS do not have access to the data.
- At no point will any information leave Australia or be accessible to anyone or any organisation outside of Australia.
 - This is prohibited under the draft bill, including addressing the US Cloud Act issue. We were advised on this by the Attorney-General's Department on Monday 4 May.
 - Questions on this are best directed to the Attorney-General's Department.
- The infrastructure is certified under the Australian Signals Directorate's Certified Cloud Services List and is rated to the 'PROTECTED' classification.
- No data is housed/hosted/stored on any Global Switch Ultimo infrastructure.

App security

- In terms of the security of information at each stage/component of the ecosystem:
 - The COVIDSafe App (code) itself is encrypted at the phone level. With the right tools/skills it can be decompiled.
 - The data stored on the phone (i.e. the information collected through Bluetooth handshakes) is encoded.
 - The information stored on a user's phone comprises the encoded reference of the other user's phone number, the phone model, the data and time stamp when a contact occurs and the proximity of the contact captured through the signal strength of the Bluetooth digital handshake.
 - Information only leaves a user's phone if the user tests positive for coronavirus and they give consent for their information to be uploaded.
 - The 'close contact' or Bluetooth handshake information is encrypted as it is transmitted from a user's phone to the AWS cloud in the event of a positive coronavirus diagnosis.
 - Information that is stored on the AWS cloud is encrypted.

Availability of the app

- The COVIDSafe App was designed for use in Australia and an Australian Apple or Google Play account is required to download the app.
 - The DTA is exploring options that would allow people with an international number, but are physically here in Australia, to download and use the app.
- Users also need an Australian mobile phone number starting with '04' and containing 10 digits to register for the app.
 - The DTA is aware this excludes some members of the community—for example people in remote territories (such as Norfolk Island). We are exploring options to allow these people to download and use the app.

- We are aware that there is a current issue pertaining to users who are outside mobile coverage footprint and typically depend on Wi-Fi calling (Voice over LTE) to make calls and send and receive data texts via messaging services like WhatsApp and iMessage.
 - We have had discussions with network providers and have identified a possible solution.
 - We are working with the carriers and developers to confirm the solution and schedule it for a future update.
- We've built the App to support as broad a range of handsets as possible, but there are limits as to how far back we can go for reasons such as security, and Bluetooth capability. We are working to expand out the range of devices on which it can be used.

Health Admin Portal

- I understand that bilateral agreements related to access to the Health Admin Portal have not yet been finalised between states and territories and the Commonwealth.
- The Department of Health can speak in more detail about this.
- Pending having these agreements in place, we expect the Health Admin Portal to be ready to go live on Friday.

Functionality

Background/foreground iOS issues

- The app runs either in the foreground or background on iOS and Android devices. The foreground refers to when the phone is unlocked and the app is open on the screen. The background refers to when you switch from using the app to another app or when the phone is locked.
- There are some limitations to Bluetooth functionality on iPhones due to Apple's operating system design that preserves battery when an app is running in the background on an iPhone. This is a known issue.
- On iOS devices, COVIDSafe does work in the background but there may be some variability in the digital handshakes.
 - The variability in operation can be influenced by a number of factors such as the phone model, the age of the phone, the state of the battery, the operating environment (i.e. if there are many other devices close by).
 - The Apple operating system automatically manages the overall phone performance, including the use of Bluetooth, based on these range of factors. The phone performance is managed at the operating system level of the phone and the App has a limited ability to influence that performance.
- The update Apple is working on now will help to resolve this issue.
- This is only an issue for iOS devices. Android devices manage background apps very well.

If asked about testing: Performance has been tested and the results show good performance in the foreground and background performance on Android devices, good performance in the foreground for iOS devices and variable performance in the background on iOS devices.

If pressed on testing logs: Take it on notice.

If asked about building a product that doesn't work: The app works. COVIDSafe supplements the existing and ongoing practices of health officials doing manual contact tracing, making it faster and easier for these people to do their jobs. If we had waited for the perfect conditions to release, we would have nothing in place to help these frontline workers.

If asked about the Apple solution: We are working with Apple on getting their update into the COVIDSafe app.

Collection of contacts

- The exchange of Bluetooth signals between phones (a 'digital handshake') happens between two phones that have the app.
- To get these handshakes the app 'polls' around it every minute for new connections, and to register the duration of existing handshakes.
- When the handshake (contacts) information is uploaded with a user's consent to the secure information storage system (only in the case of a positive COVID-19 diagnosis), an algorithm analyses signal strength and duration to use it to make an approximate determination of the contacts were close contacts (i.e. within 1.5 metres for 15 minutes or more, based on advice from the Department of Health).

Source code

- Government has committed to make the code for the app publicly available. It will do so in due course, pending final approval of the security agencies.
- The App code will be made publicly available this week.

Domestic violence/stalking risk

Talking points

- We are aware of concerns raised by Domestic Violence (DV) support and advocacy groups regarding the possibility that information relating to the device is accessible if a third party has access to a COVIDSafe user's phone, as well as the right tools and skills.
- The contact tracing app has been built to ensure privacy from the outset. We are exploring how to introduce additional security mechanisms to further protect users.
- Women—and other people at increased personal security risk—should continue to make personal decisions as to whether to download the app, based on their understanding of their personal safety situations.

Detail

- Users will not have access to the data that is generated or received as a result of the Bluetooth 'digital handshakes'. This data remains on the phone, leveraging the phones encryption, until and only if a user receives a positive COVID19 diagnosis. In the event of a positive diagnosis, the data, with the consent of the

user, is uploaded to a secure data store for access by State/Territory health authorities.

- To further enhance the privacy of people, the data that is stored on a phone auto deletes on a 21 day rolling basis.
- The DTA is aware of concerns raised by Domestic Violence (DV) support and advocacy group regarding the possibility that information relating to the make and model of a phone as well as the 'name' of the device being accessible, were an individual to have access to a COVIDSafe user's phone, as well as the right tools and skills.
 - The exchange of this type of information is considered standard Bluetooth 'protocol' and is not a flaw or deficiency in design of the COVIDSafe app.
- While not impossible, downloading raw, encrypted data off a phone and reverse engineering the code for the app (which, when publicly released, will be redacted and not include encryption methodologies/tools) to access some level of data **is possible**.
 - However, doing so would require sophisticated tools and highly technical and uncommon skills.
- In the third release of the COVIDSafe app, the DTA will continue to work with the ACSC and ASD to identify opportunities to further strengthen the security and performance of the application.

Interference with Bluetooth medical devices

Talking points

- We are aware of an issue with the app and Continuous Glucose Monitoring (CGM) apps on Android devices.
- Users of CGM equipment and other medical devices that use Bluetooth should follow instructions for their medical device regarding the possibility of interference.
- If the app interferes with an individuals' Bluetooth-enabled medical devices, they should continue to use their medical devices and not use the COVIDSafe app.

Detail

- The DTA is aware that some Continuous Glucose Monitoring (CGM) apps on Android devices may experience Bluetooth interference when using the COVIDSafe app.
 - CGM apps may be prone to interference from a variety of other applications that are also using Bluetooth.
- We are currently investigating the issue and early investigations indicate it is isolated to Android devices with CGM apps.
 - To date, no other similar issues have been raised.
 - We are currently exploring options to address this issue and will update the app if needed/possible.
 - If the user has a second mobile device, they are able to download COVIDSafe on it.
- With or without the COVIDSafe app, it is important to note that manual tracing will still take place ensuring state and territory health officials contact as many people as possible who have been in contact with a person who tests positive for coronavirus.

Self-isolation self-report form

- The DTA built a self-isolation reporting form for Australia.gov.au and in the Coronavirus Australia app on 29 March. The form is voluntary.
- The Department of Health has policy responsibility for the self-isolation reporting form, including the purpose of it, the collection and use of data from the form, and the privacy impacts.

If pressed [do not volunteer this information]: The form collects information including name, address, contact number, age, gender, whether a person is self-isolating and whether a person has been tested for COVID-19, when they were tested and the results of that test.

	Responsible Executive	Key Contact
Name:	Randall Brugeaud	s47F
Mobile phone number:	s47F	s47F

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Senate Select Committee on COVID-19**TIMELINE****Talking points**

- The DTA has worked with agencies across government to deliver information and services through a variety of digital channels as part of the Government's response to the coronavirus pandemic.
- We have worked at speed to design and deliver new digital tools to make it simpler, easier and faster for people to access government information and services.

If asked for specific dates or details about advice to Ministers/Cabinet:

- I have been speaking with the Minister on a daily basis since early March when the coronavirus pandemic began to escalate.
- We have been providing advice on a rolling basis to support the Minister, Cabinet and National Cabinet with their decision-making.
- We have provided advice on the technical and design issues with regard to the COVIDSafe App, informed by our understanding of the international experience.

March**w/c 9 March**

- DTA staff outposted to Department of Health to help with content design and information architecture
- Minister for Health announced the development of a COVID-19 app

w/c 16 March

- DTA started working with Department of Health on the Coronavirus Australia app
- DTA tasked by Government to develop single portal for COVID-19 using Australia.gov.au
- DTA launched new Australia.gov.au capability
- Started work on WhatsApp messaging channel with Atlassian
- Started building self-isolation self-report form for Australia.gov.au

COVIDSafe/contact tracing

- DTA participated in meeting with Singapore Government, Home Affairs and Department of Communications on the Singaporean digital contact tracing solution (note: not organised by DTA)

w/c 23 March

- Initial engagement with the Department of Home Affairs on work on contact tracing
- Coronavirus Australia information app released (29 March)
- WhatsApp channel released (29 March)
- SMS sent to all Australian mobile phones directing people to Australia.gov.au (note: not organised by DTA)
- Working closely with Services Australia to enable digital welfare

COVIDSafe/contact tracing

- Engagement with the Department of Home Affairs on work on contact tracing

w/c 30 March

- Self-isolation self-report form went live on both Australia.gov.au and in the Coronavirus Australia app
- Coronavirus Australian app transferred from Department of Health to DTA post-release
- Engaged with Office of the Australian Information Commissioner on self-isolation form
- First SMS sent to all Australian mobile phones directing people to Australia.gov.au (note: not organised by DTA)

COVIDSafe/contact tracing

- Ongoing engagement with Home Affairs, Health and Government on contact tracing

April**w/c 6 April**

- Testing of interim identity and CRN online solutions for digital welfare commenced
- Engaged with ASD and ACSC on contact tracing capability.
- Second SMS sent to all Australian mobile phones about Easter travel and referring people to Australia.gov.au (note: not organised by DTA)

COVIDSafe/contact tracing

- Contact tracing work transferred from Department of Home Affairs to Department of Health and DTA.

w/c 13 April

- Engaged with Australian Health Protection Principle Committee (AHPPC).
- Implemented new governance arrangements for the information products that includes the NCCC
- Interim identity solution and CRN online for digital welfare deployed
- DTA conducted a limited tender for development and maintenance of the Coronavirus Australia app (DELV was awarded the contract). The original procurement was undertaken by the Department of Health

COVIDSafe/contact tracing

- Ongoing engagement with government and the Department of Health on contact tracing.
- Department of Health commissioned independent Privacy Impact Assessment on COVIDSafe.
- Engaged with the Office of the OAIC, the Australian Human Rights Commissioner, Attorney General's Department and Department of Health on privacy matters

w/c 20 April**COVIDSafe/contact tracing**

- ACSC undertook vulnerability assessment of COVIDSafe (note: ACSC report is protected)
- Independent cyber security assessment undertaken by Cyber Security Cooperative Centre Research
- Testing of COVIDSafe undertaken
- Determination made under the Biosecurity Act (note: led by Department of Health)
- Privacy Impact Assessment published (note: led by Department of Health)
- COVIDSafe launched (26 April)

w/c 27 April

- Updates make to Australia.gov.au and the Coronavirus Australia to promote COVIDSafe

COVIDSafe/contact tracing

- COVIDSafe support desks went live in DTA (email) and in the Department of Health (telephony)

May**w/c 4 May**

- Third SMS sent to all Australian mobile phones with a call to action download COVIDSafe and directing people to an Australia.gov.au subpage (note: not organised by DTA)

COVIDSafe/contact tracing

- Release two of COVIDSafe was rolled out
- Health Admin portal release (expected Friday)
- App code to be made publicly available

	Responsible Executive	Key Contact
Name:	Randall Brugeaud	s47F
Mobile phone number:	s47F	s47F

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Senate Select Committee on COVID-19

KEY STATS

[Figures are correct as at 7.30am Wednesday 6 May 2020]

COVIDSafe

- 5.08 million (5,086,284) registrations since it went live on 26 April 2020.
 - *If asked: the app has been 5.05 million downloads as at 4 May [note this is two days older than registration figures]*
- 1.49 million (1,495,584) users were active from 8.00 am-10.00 am today
- 13,217 queries to the DTA COVIDSafe support centre since 26 April, with 11,133 queries resolved

Australia.gov.au

- 16.9 million total visits since the site went live on 18 March 2020
 - 9.7 million unique visits in that time (27.1% of traffic)
 - 72.9% are returning visitors
- The most popular pages are State and Territory information and travel advice.
- Visitors spend an average of 1.5 minutes on the site.

Coronavirus Australia App

- 3.54 million downloads since it went live on 29 March 2020.
 - 2,693,296 iOS
 - 851,308 Android
- It has been uninstalled 173,600 times.

Self-report form

- 74,600 forms have been completed since it went live on 29 March 2020.
 - (11,400 web and 63,200 App).

WhatsApp messenger

- 936,416 unique users of the WhatsApp channel since it went live on 29 March 2020.
- 14.5 million messages sent and received since the channel went live

Additional Briefing Material

[Attachment A: DTA Usage Dashboard as at 7.30 am, 6 May](#)

	Responsible Executive	Key Contact
Name:	Randall Brugeaud	s47F
Mobile phone number:	s47F	s47F



COVIDSafe App Registrations 5,086,284

Cross Channel Statistics

Coronavirus App



Coronavirus Australia


	Week 0	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5
	100.0%	48.7%	45.3%	39.2%	43.7%	6.8%
Mar 22 - Mar 28 293 Users	100.0%	24.2%	7.8%	7.2%	5.5%	6.8%
Mar 29 - Apr 4 2,532,286 Users	100.0%	49.3%	46.1%	39.4%	43.7%	
Apr 5 - Apr 11 179,854 Users	100.0%	44.7%	35.4%	37.2%		
Apr 12 - Apr 18 120,046 Users	100.0%	41.9%	42.5%			
Apr 19 - Apr 25 96,852 Users	100.0%	49.7%				
Apr 26 - May 2 524,245 Users	100.0%					

Are people coming back?

WhatsApp



Are people coming back?



iOS Installs 2,693,296

Android Installs 851,308

Unique users 936,416

Messages received 7,251,504

Total messages 14,506,165

Australia.gov.au

Total visits 16.9M

New visitors 9.7M

Completed Webforms 11.4k

Completed Appforms 63.2k


Traffic to the Jurisdictions

Jurisdiction	Visitors
Commonwealth	6,189,578
NSW	376,097
VIC	296,246
QLD	257,597
SA	151,967
WA	146,430
TAS	56,270
ACT	43,116
NT	27,927

Issues of interest

Issues	Visitors
State & Territory information	1,355,650
Travel advice	686,233
Prime Minister's updates	582,441
Health	546,258
Economic support	538,353
Individual assistance	527,191
Education & childcare	298,466
Symptom checker	255,285
Business assistance	80,422

Are people coming back?



Completed Webforms

11.4k

Mean time on page

01:28

New visitors

9.7M

Bounce Rate

61.1%


Total visits

16.9M

How much do they read?

Scroll Depth	Users
25%	3,500,854
50%	2,023,085
75%	1,248,348
100%	287,607


What devices are people using?



Where are people coming from?

Traffic source	visitors
(direct)	7,284,611
google	4,579,394
m.facebook.com	2,119,212
my.gov.au	990,284
4788359	219,413
WhatsApp	154,952
bing	128,062

Are people coming back?




Where are people going to?

URL	Visitors
https://apps.apple.com/au/app/covidsafe/id1509242894	492,420
https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/covid-19/Pages/covid-19-english.aspx?lang_engl...	393,373
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=au.gov.health.covidsafe	377,517
https://www.australia.gov.au/#state-government	252,236
https://www.healthdirect.gov.au/symptom-checker/tool?symptom=CORO	251,225
http://www.coronavirus.vic.gov.au/	238,026
https://preview.nsw.gov.au/covid-19	233,328
https://www.pm.gov.au/media/national-cabinet-statement	187,305
https://www.qld.gov.au/health/conditions/health-alerts/coronavirus-covid-19	151,335
https://treasury.gov.au/coronavirus/jobkeeper	123,512
http://www.wa.gov.au/government/coronavirus-covid-19	108,191
https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app	107,778
https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/individuals/subjects/affected-coronavirus-co...	104,678
https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/individuals/subjects/affected-coronavirus-co...	103,854
https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/individuals/subjects/affected-coronavirus-co...	100,936
https://treasury.gov.au/coronavirus	99,867
https://www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-220320	96,688
https://www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health...	90,585
https://www.pm.gov.au/media/update-coronavirus-measures-24-March-2020	85,454
https://www.australia.gov.au/	85,051
https://www.dese.gov.au/news/coronavirus-covid-19	84,850

Cross Website Statistics


Yesterday's visitors




Today's website visitors by city

Town/City	Health ▾	ServiceAustralia	Australia	Business	Smartrave...
Sydney	9,487	6,351	5,004	1,019	4
Melbourne	8,919	5,074	4,725	972	3
Brisbane	4,824	null	2,583	null	null
Perth	4,068	2,522	2,397	286	1
Adelaide	1,898	null	1,108	null	null
Canberra	547	160	200	35	1
Gold Coast	378	null	188	null	null
Auckland	296	null	20	null	null
London	237	null	106	null	null
Sunshine Coast	153	null	70	null	null

Website visitors for the past month




Today's traffic by Google defined category






Coronavirus App

Users in last 30 minutes



Screens viewed



Springboard is the main screen,
Advice view is the advice screen -
Safari view is the in app browser
News view is the news screen

Total installs	3.54m
% iOS users on latest version	83.1%
% Android users on latest version	89.3%
Crashfree rate	98.39%
Uninstalls	173.6k

Users by country

Country	Users	New users	Engaged sessions
Totals	3,577,125 100% of total	3,555,703 100% of total	23,810,029 100% of total
1 Australia	3,551,879	3,524,500	23,656,252
2 United States	8,482	4,054	20,828
3 China	3,334	2,817	7,079
4 United Kingdom	3,191	1,801	9,342
5 India	2,699	2,356	18,423
6 New Zealand	2,665	2,468	8,878
7 Hong Kong	1,700	1,352	8,496
8 Singapore	1,516	1,146	5,777

Users by town/city

Town/City	Users	New users	Engaged sessions
Totals	3,577,125 100% of total	3,555,703 100% of total	23,810,029 100% of total
1 Sydney	1,231,301	1,098,008	7,048,735
2 Melbourne	1,098,560	972,059	6,589,676
3 Brisbane	603,682	518,474	3,513,579
4 Perth	341,511	315,257	2,184,758
5 Adelaide	268,186	244,806	1,944,418
6 Gold Coast	80,620	46,440	295,373
7 Canberra	79,572	61,663	400,571
8 (not set)	37,559	20,140	116,305

Users by OS

Platform	Active users	% Total	Engagement
iOS	2,693,296	76%	2m 01s
Android	851,308	24%	1m 05s




Total Unique Users
936,416


Received messages (all time)
7,251,504

Total messages (in+out all time)
14,506,165


Visitors per hour (week from Sunday)




Returning visitors per day



Number of messages by unique visitors



Menus seen by unique visitors







App store data as of 04 May 2020

iOS			
Total installs	3.31m	Uninstalls	76.4k
% users on latest version	100%	Crashes	16.9k

Android			
Total installs	1.74m	Uninstalls	233.2k
% users on latest version	100%	Crashes	13.1k

Installs by software version



Senate Select Committee on COVID-19

COVIDSAFE – CONTRACTURAL ARRANGEMENTS

Key Statistics

- The DTA has conducted procurement activities valued at \$1,512,059.37 (incl. GST) to support the development and deployment of the COVIDSafe application and ecosystem. *This figure relates only to DTA arrangements.*
- This includes four procurements with the following organisations:
 - Amazon Web Services (AWS) - \$709,059.37 (incl. GST)
 - Hosting costs were \$17,745
 - Shine Solutions - \$275,000.00 (incl GST)
 - BCG Digital Ventures - \$484,000.00 (incl. GST)
 - Ionize Pty Ltd - \$44,000 (incl. GST)
- Further detail regarding these procurements is available at [Attachment A](#).
- Information regarding procurements by the Department of Home Affairs can be found in their QoN response to the Senate Select Committee ([Attachment B](#)) but should not be released or discussed.

Key Talking Points

- In order to meet expectations about the development and release timeframes for the COVIDSafe application, the DTA conducted procurement activities to replicate the initial development of the application and ecosystem by the Department of Home Affairs.
 - Changes in supplier arrangements would have introduced an unacceptable risk to the on-time delivery of the application.
- Conducting a fresh approach to market would have set back the release of the application by several weeks, and likely resulted in higher cost to the Australian Government, as the work already done may not have been transferrable to another supplier.
- All procurements were conducted in accordance with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) and the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs).
 - The DTA utilised panel arrangements for each procurement activity.
 - Panel arrangements are established through open approaches to market (excluding AWS which is limited as a WofG standing offer arrangement) and suppliers are selected following a value for money assessment.
 - This means DTA met its obligations under Division 2 of the CPRs.

- It is important to note that section 10.3 b) of the CPRs specifically identifies that where, for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseen by the relevant entity, the entity is not bound by Division 2 of the CPRs. The COVID19 pandemic directly relates to intention of this clause and therefore the DTA made decisions that would directly benefit Australians while remaining within the confines of legislation.
- These procurements provided the DTA with the right mix of specialisation, expertise and flexibility to develop and deploy the COVIDSafe application in a short timeframe.

If asked 'Why were Amazon Web Services and BCG Digital Ventures chosen to develop the contact tracing application?'

- As the Department of Home Affairs was responsible for the initial development of the application, this question should be referred to that department.

If asked 'Why were DELV and Ionize contracted?'

- The DTA contracted Canberra-based DELV to provide additional application development support.
- Ionize, another Canberra-based company, has been contracted to provide penetration and other cyber security resilience testing.
- These companies were chosen for their ability to perform the required work in a short timeframe.
 - DELV has previously completed high quality work for multiple agencies.
 - Ionize was recommended to the DTA by the cyber industry body AustCyber (Part of a government initiative established through the National Innovation and Science Agenda. AustCyber was set up to drive skills and capability in cyber resilience).

If asked 'Why was AWS, an American company, chosen to host sensitive Australian data'.

- The DTA made arrangements to replicate the arrangements the Department of Home Affairs put in place for the initial development of the application and ecosystem.
- The DTA can confirm all information collected and used by the COVIDSafe app and ecosystem will be stored on Australian based cloud infrastructure.
 - Information only leaves a user's phone if the user tests positive for Coronavirus and give consent for the data to be uploaded.
 - Information that is stored on AWS infrastructure is encrypted.
 - The information is also encrypted as it is transmitted from a user's phone to the AWS cloud.
- Under the terms of the contract between AWS and the DTA, AWS will have no access to the data.
- At no point will any information leave or Australia or be accessible to anyone or any organisation outside of Australia.

- The infrastructure is certified under the Australian Signals Directorate's Certified Cloud Services List and is rated to the 'PROTECTED' classification.

Additional Briefing Material

[Attachment A: Summary of procurements](#)

[Attachment B: Copy of Department of Home Affairs QoN response to Senate Select Committee regarding COVID-19 Tracing App Contracts](#)

	Responsible Executive	Key Contact
Name:	Anthony Warnock	s47F
Mobile phone number:	s47F	s47F

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Freedom Of Information Act 1982
By The Department Of Health And Aged Care

Attachment A

	Amazon Web Services (AWS) Pty Ltd	Shine Solutions Group Trust	BCG Digital Ventures	Ionize Pty Ltd
What procurement method was used?	Limited via the AWS Whole of Government Arrangement	Open tender via a panel (Digital Marketplace SON3413842)	Open via a panel (DoF Business Advisory Panel SON3305648)	Open tender via a panel (Digital Marketplace SON3413842)
What date was the tender issued?	6 April 2020	23 April 2020	15 April 2020	20 April 2020
On what date were the tender responses received?	6 April 2020	23 April 2020	15 April 2020	20 April 2020
What date was the contract signed?	23 April 2020	24 April 2020	16 April 2020	23 April 2020
What is the contract value?	\$709,059.37 (inc GST)	\$275,000.00 (inc GST)	\$484,000 (inc GST)	\$44,000 (inc GST)
What is the term of the contract?	6 April to 31 December 2020	24 April to 22 July 2020	16 April to 8 May 2020	28 April to 08 May 2020
Which entities were invited to tender?	DTA approached AWS as it took the contract over from Home Affairs as the original lead agency. Moving to a different provider would have represented an unacceptable risk to the delivery of the app. Home Affairs is best to comment on the original approach to market including why AWS were considered the best solution for delivery of the app.	Shine Solutions Group Trust (Shine) as the partner provider for AWS. Shine was the sole entity approached due to need to have an AWS approved partner delivering these services.	DTA approached BCG as it took the contract over from Home Affairs as the original lead agency. Moving to a different provider would have represented an unacceptable risk to the delivery of the app. Home Affairs is best to comment on the original approach to market including why BCG were considered the best solution for delivery of the app.	Ionize was the sole entity approached. This was following the recommendation of AustCyber, an independent, not-for-profit organisation, that Ionize would be best positioned to deliver the required services.
How was clause 4.7 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules assessed?	Clause 4.7 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules does not apply to procurements from standing offers. However, it is important to note that the release of COVIDsafe will assist the Australian economy by reducing the isolation period and therefore allowing businesses to reopen.			

Attachment A

	Amazon Web Services (AWS) Pty Ltd	Shine Solutions Group Trust	BCG Digital Ventures	Ionize Pty Ltd
Which officials were involved in the decision to award a tender – please provide a name if the official was a member of the Senior Executive Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peter Alexander, Chief Digital Officer, delegate David Donovan, CFO Anthony Warnock, Branch Head of Digital Infrastructure Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> David Donovan CFO, delegate Anthony Warnock, Branch Head of Digital Infrastructure Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peter Alexander, Chief Digital Officer, delegate David Donovan, CFO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> David Donovan CFO, delegate Anthony Warnock, Branch Head of Digital Infrastructure Service
What is the scope of work?	<p>AWS was contracted to deliver the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> AWS Platform Design and Build AWS Mobile Web App Build Administration of App Build Project Control 	<p>Shine was contracted for provision of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level 2 and 3 support for software defects, investigation and rectification. Level 2 and 3 support for AWS hosted services and engagement with AWS for AWS infrastructure support and escalation where needed. 	<p>BCG was contracted to support delivery of the app in order to enable the public launch. This included:</p> <p>Product build - Complete build and testing of features for launch into the user interface, in conjunction with AWS and Shine Solutions.</p> <p>Develop operating model</p> <p>Define metrics and developing the dashboard for reporting on the uptake, usage and other impact metrics for the app.</p>	<p>Ionize was contracted to provide an independent assessment of the Cyber Security posture of the contact trace product being developed by the DTA. Including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Penetration testing Overall Cyber Security Risk assessment. <p>Including a risk and mitigation table leveraging an appropriate risk matrix (also defined in the report), which are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quantified Prioritised Have documented mitigations
Does the contract awarded accord with Agency's and Government principles as enshrined in DTA's Whole-of-government Hosting Strategy"?	Yes, because the app is a standalone solution not a platform.			

HOME AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY WRITTEN QUESTION ON NOTICE

Senate Select Committee COVID-19

QoN Number: IQ20-000034

Subject: COVID-19 Tracing app - Contracts

Asked by: Rex Patrick

Question:

What contracts has the Department let in relation to the application (including development/data storage etc.)? For each contract:

- a. When was the tender released?
- b. What procurement method was used?
- c. If a limited tender was used:
 - i. What was the reason for choosing a limited tender?
 - ii. What date was the tender issued?
 - iii. Which entities were invited to tender?
 - iv. How was clause 4.7 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules assessed?
 - v. On what date were the tender responses received?
 - vi. Which officials were involved in the decision to award a tender – please provide a name if the official was a member of the Senior Executive Service
 - vii. What date was the contract signed?
 - viii. What is the scope of work?
 - ix. What is the contract value?
 - x. What is the term of the contract?
- d. Does the contract award accord with Digital Transformation Agency and Government principles as enshrined in DTA's Whole-of-government Hosting Strategy"? <https://www.dta.gov.au/our-projects/whole-government-hosting-strategy>)

Answer:

The Department of Home Affairs commenced procurement activities in relation to an early 'conceptual prototype' design. The following existing Whole-of-Government Panels and Standing Offers were used to engage three (3) vendors. Matters relating to the COVIDSafe procurement should be directed to the DTA.

Attachment B

Table 1 – Procurements Prototype Development

Name	Panel or Standing Offer	Value Ex GST
Amazon Web Services (AWS)	DTA AWS Whole of Government Arrangement – Standing Offer	\$164,995.64
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG)	DTA Digital Marketplace Whole of Government Panel – Standing Offer	\$220,000.00
CTO Group	Treasury Portfolio Panel – Standing Offer	\$31,200.00
TOTAL COST		\$416,195.64

- a. Not applicable as existing Whole-of-Government Panels and/or Standing Offers were used.
- b. Please refer to Table 1- Procurements Prototype Development (above).
- c. A limited tender was not used.
- d. Yes.

Date Approved: 1 May 2020
SES Contact Officer: Mathew Smorhun, Senior Assistant Secretary, s47F
Consultation: Digital Transformation Agency, Department of Health
Additional Clearance from: N/A

Senate Select Committee on COVID-19**COVIDSAFE – PRIVACY AND LEGAL ISSUES****Talking points**

- We have worked closely with our colleagues in the Department of Health and the Attorney General's Department to adopt **a privacy by design approach** to ensure robust technical, data governance and legal protections are in place.
- We have addressed the recommendations from the Privacy Impact Assessment:
 - We made changes to allow people to use any name they chose – they are not required to use their actual name
 - We moved to age range rather than age
 - We removed the Department of Health as the data custodian – they govern the system but have no access to the data
 - We established a detailed and complete Privacy Notice.
- And part of each release, we assess whether any technical changes will impact on the privacy settings and controls on the App.

App features

- We worked very closely the Department of Health to make sure the necessary privacy features and controls were built into the design of the App, consistent with existing privacy requirements and the recommendations from the Privacy Impact Assessment.
- These features include making sure people were provided with information in a user-friendly way so they could understand the purpose of the App and provide **informed consent** to use the App.
- The App includes a number of frequently asked questions and includes advice about:
 - the type of personal information that is collected,
 - what information is stored on people's mobiles,
 - where people's personal data is stored,
 - how that information will be used to support contact tracing by state and territory health officials, and
 - links to the Department of Health's privacy policy.

Legal safeguards

- We have also worked closely with Health and the Attorney General's Department to ensure the App and legislative safeguards are fully aligned.

Data Store Administrator

If asked – who is the data store administrator today?

- The DTA is the current administrator of the National COVIDSafe data store as the component of the system has not yet moved to a 'live' or production environment.
- When the data store goes 'live' responsibility for its administration will transfer to the Department of Health, as provided for in the draft Bill.
- The draft Bill also allows the Secretary of Health to make a determination that a particular agency may be the data store administrator for the purposes of one or more provisions (94Z).
- We are in the process of working through with Health what may be required for any determination.

Key dates – COVIDSafe App

- 18 March 2020: Mr Brugeaud, Ms Poole and Ms Hutchinson participated in a teleconference with the Information Commissioner, Ms Angelene Falk to discuss the purpose of the App and the work being lead by the Department of Health on the Privacy Impact Statement.
- 16 April 2020: Mr Alexander and Ms Hutchinson participated in a teleconference with the Information Commissioner, the Human Rights Commissioner, Health and AGD on the policy intent, design and operation of the App.
- 20 April 2020: Mr Warnock and Ms Hutchinson participate in a teleconference with Health, Maddocks and AGD on the draft Privacy Impact Assessment.
- 24 April 2020: Mr Brugeaud writes to the Secretary for Health and asks that the Minister for Health make a determination under the *Biosecurity Act 2015* to provide legal protections that will support the public release, uptake and use of the App.
- 25 April 2020: The Minister for Health issues the [Biosecurity \(Human Biosecurity Emergency\) \(Human Coronavirus with Pandemic Potential\) \(Emergency Requirements—Public Health Contact Information\) Determination 2020](#)
- 25 April 2020: Health publish the Privacy Impact Statement and their response to the recommendations.
- 4 May 2020: The Attorney-General releases an exposure draft of the [Privacy Amendment \(Public Health Contact Information\) Bill 2020](#).

Attachment

[Attachment A: Letter to the Secretary of Health re the Biosecurity Determination](#)

	Responsible Executive
Name:	Joanne Hutchinson
Mobile phone number:	s47F [REDACTED]

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Australian Government
Digital Transformation Agency

dta

PO Box 457
CANBERRA ACT 2601
dta.gov.au

Ms Caroline Edwards
A/g Secretary
Department of Health
GPO Box 9848
Canberra ACT 2601

Dear Secretary

Caroline

I write to seek your assistance for the Minister for Health to make a Determination under the Biosecurity Act 2015 to support the introduction and uptake of the COVIDSafe App as part of the Government's response to COVID-19. I am of the view that sufficient evidence exists at this time to establish the grounds to the satisfaction of the Health Minister for this step to be taken.

Understanding the nature and extent of community transmission of COVID-19 is fundamental to the public health response to COVID-19. The Digital Transformation Agency has developed the COVIDSafe App, in consultation with your department and the Australian Signals Directorate, to assist State and Territory health officials to more easily undertake contact tracing and limit the spread of COVID-19 in the community.

The COVIDSafe App works by identifying the mobile device of people using the App when they come into close contact with each other, via Bluetooth. If an App user is subsequently diagnosed with COVID-19, the information about their contacts within the last 21 days will be uploaded with the user's consent to the National COVIDSafe data store and accessed by authorised State and Territory public health officials to assist with contact tracing.

Digital contact tracing has been a key component of the public health response to COVID-19 in other countries. The overseas experience demonstrates the importance of having strong legal and privacy safeguards in place to promote public confidence in digital contact tracing and the subsequent uptake and use of Apps.

Recent media and public discussion in Australia about a possible contact tracing App have raised a number of concerns about privacy, surveillance and secondary use of information collected by the App for law enforcement purposes. It is essential that these concerns are addressed in order for the public health benefits that flow from the use of the COVIDSafe to be realised.

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I am advised that a Determination made under the Biosecurity Act 2015 will provide the necessary legal and privacy safeguards while the Government is considering the introduction of primary legislation.

To maximise community confidence in the COVIDSafe App, and people's willingness to download and then use the App, in my view it will be important that the Determination ensures that:

- data generated by the App can be collected, used and disclosed only for the following limited purposes:
 - contact tracing
 - ensuring the proper functioning and integrity of the App itself and the data store, including the transmission of data between mobile handsets using the App and from those handsets to the data store
 - producing de-identified statistical information
- in particular, data generated by the App cannot be collected, used or disclosed for enforcement or compliance purposes, except where necessary to investigate whether a breach of the Determination has occurred or to prosecute a person for such a breach. I understand this is required to be permitted to ensure the data protections set out in the Determination can be enforced.
- a person's consent is required to upload data from the App from their mobile handset to the data store
- data from the App is not retained on a person's handset for more than 21 days (other than initial registration data or a unique identifier)
- where data from the App is uploaded from a handset to the data store, the data must not be retained on a database outside Australia
- data from the App in the data store must be destroyed after the COVID-19 pandemic has concluded
- encrypted data generated by the app that is stored on a person's mobile handset must not be decrypted
- consistent with the consensual nature of the App and the uploading of data from it, people may not be coerced into downloading or operating the app, or uploading data from the app.

I consider a Determination that ensures the above matters will greatly assist in allaying any concerns the public may have about the collection and use of their personal data and support the uptake and effective use of the COVIDSafe App in the community, which would in turn assist in preventing or controlling the spread of COVID-19 in Australia. In particular, the Determination will give the Australian community confidence that there are appropriate controls in place to ensure their personal data is being collected, handled and stored appropriately and only with their consent.

I have copied this letter to the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department, the Chief Medical Officer.

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Yours sincerely

s47F



Randall Brugeaud
Chief Executive Officer

24 April 2020

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Senate Select Committee on COVID-19

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE

Digital Transformation Agency

Topic: COVID-19 Tracing Application

Senator: Rex Patrick

Type of question: Written, 28 April 2020

Date set by the committee for the return of answer: 6 May 2020

Question(s):

1. Who does the Agency understand to be the lead authority for the app? Please indicate if this has changed over time, and if so, why?
2. What involvement has the Department (or its portfolio agencies) had in the design/development/procurement of the app?
3. Which Government Departments/Agency have provided the Agency with advice relating to the app?
4. What contracts has the Agency let in relation to the application (including development/data storage etc.)? For each contract:
 - a. When was the tender released?
 - b. What procurement method was used?
 - c. If a limited tender was used:
 - i. What was the reason for choosing a limited tender?
 - ii. What date was the tender issued?
 - iii. Which entities were invited to tender?
 - iv. How was clause 4.7 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules assessed?
 - v. On what date were the tender responses received?
 - vi. Which officials were involved in the decision to award a tender – please provide a name if the official was a member of the Senior Executive Service.
 - vii. What date was the contract signed?
 - viii. What is the scope of work?
 - ix. What is the contract value?
 - x. What is the term of the contract?
 - d. Does the contract award accord with Agency's and Government principles as enshrined in DTA's Whole-of-government Hosting Strategy?"

Answer(s):

1. The Department of Health is the agency responsible for the COVIDSafe application. The Australian Cyber Security Centre, Australian Signals Directorate, Attorney-General's Department and the Digital Transformation Agency (DTA) provide specialist advice, skills and capability to the development of the application. The initial prototype of the application was completed by the Department of Home Affairs.
2. Since Monday the 6th of April 2020, the DTA has been responsible for the technical design and development of the application. The DTA has also conducted some procurement activities related to these two functions.
3. Please see response to Question 1.

4. Four contracts have been awarded to support the development and use of the COVIDSafe application.

Ionize (Cyber Security Assessment Services)

- a. An open tender was released on 20 April 2020.
- b. The tender was released via a panel (Digital Marketplace SON3413842).
- c. N/A
- d. N/A

Shine Solutions Group Trust (Helpdesk Support)

- a. An open tender was released on 23 April 2020.
- b. The tender was released via a panel (Digital Marketplace SON3413842).
- c. N/A
- d. N/A

Boston Consulting Group

- a. An open tender was released on 15 April 2020.
- b. The tender was released via a panel (Department of Finance Business Advisory Panel SON3305648).
- c. N/A
- d. N/A

Amazon Web Services Australia Pty Ltd (AWS inc Shine as sub-contractor)

- a. AWS was approached to provide a quote on 6 April 2020.
- b. The request was made via the AWS Whole-of-Government Arrangement.
- c. This represented a limited tender procurement method:
 - i. Due to genuine urgency and continuation of an existing agreement (Commonwealth Procurement Rules 10.3.b and 10.3.e) to align with the arrangements that were originally established by the Department of Home Affairs.
 - ii. As per above, AWS was approached to provide a quote on 6 April 2020.
 - iii. Amazon Web Services (AWS)
 - iv. Clause 4.7 of the CPR's (Broader benefits to the Australian Economy) does not apply to procurements from standing offers. However, it is important to note that the release of the COVIDSafe App will assist the Australian economy by reducing the isolation period and therefore allowing businesses to reopen.
 - v. The response was received on 17 April 2020.
 - vi. The officials involved in the decision to award the tender include:
 1. Peter Alexander, Chief Digital Officer (Delegate)
 2. David Donovan, CFO
 3. Anthony Warnock, Branch Head of Digital Infrastructure Service
 - vii. The contract was executed on 24 April 2020.
 - viii. AWS were contracted to deliver the following:
 1. AWS Platform Design and Build
 2. AWS Mobile Web App Build
 3. Administration of App Build
 4. Project Control
 - ix. The contract value is \$709,059.37 incl. GST.
 - x. The term of the contract is 24 April 2020 to 23 October 2020.
- d. The contract awarded is in accordance with Agency's and Government's principles as enshrined in DTA's Whole-of-Government Hosting Strategy. AWS solution is a robust, risk assessed solution with data sovereignty and supply chain integrity.

COVIDSafe

Information Flows

KEY:



User information flow



Contact User information flow




Access



Out of scope telephone calls



Out of scope information flows



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UNSOLICITED VENDOR OFFERS FOR COVID-19 (as at 12pm 5 May 2020)		
VENDOR (A-Z)	SERVICE/PRODUCT OFFER	Response from DTA
s47G(1)(a)		Engaged, decided not to collaborate
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Engaged and collaborated with DTA
		Offer received
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Engaged and collaborated with DTA
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Offer received
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Engaged, but decided not to collaborate
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Offer received
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard response — Offer noted
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Offer noted by CEO, no future engagement
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Offer received
		Standard Response -- Offer noted
		Engaged, yet to decide on collaboration
		Offer received

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s47G(1)(a)

Standard response — Offer noted
Engaged, advised we will get back to them in future
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Offer received
Offer received
Standard Response -- Offer noted
Engaged and collaborated with DTA
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Offer received
Offer received, referred to non-COVID-19 related work
Offer received
Standard response — Offer noted
Offer received, chose not to collaborate
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted
Offer received
Standard response — Offer noted
Standard response — Offer noted

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
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§47G(1)(a)	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer received and noted on multiple occasions
	Offer received
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Offer received
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	Offer received
	Offer received
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Offer received
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Offer received -- MO response via letter
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted
	Standard response — Offer noted

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COVIDSafe

Pre-diagnosis experience



Citizens download the app, register for use, including their name, a verified mobile number, their age range and postcode of residence. They also provide consent to collect and share their registration and contact data.

Bluetooth handshakes commence between app users when they experience close contact. This allows for a contact record to be generated if the users are approximately 1.5m apart and have been in contact for 15 minutes or more.

Contact data is encrypted and stored securely on your own device, a record of each person's encrypted number and proximity is transferred between the phones.

Note: The contact data can only be accessed by health officials once it is uploaded to the secure National COVID Safe data storage system.

Data on the phone is stored on a rolling cycle and is deleted after 21 days. This supports tracing during the COVID-19 incubation and testing period.

Note: No one will be able see the data stored securely in the app until a person tests positive and the data is uploaded.

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Diagnosis experience



A citizen has symptoms and seeks medical attention.


As part of the contact from a state or territory health official about your diagnosis, your status will be changed to positive and you will be asked to upload your close contact data to health officials to support contacting people you have been in close contact with.

You will then be asked to confirm you understand your obligations having been confirmed as positive for COVID-19.

The user will be provided an SMS message with a unique code to initiate the data upload. The state or territory health official will generate the code that will be issued from the Health Portal component of the National COVID Safe data storage system.

Health officials will then begin contacting people you have been in close contact with.

Tracing contact experience



As part of notifying a person that they tested positive to COVID-19, the person will be asked about their contact history. If the person has uploaded their contact data from the COVIDSafe app, this data will be used to call close contacts that have occurred over the last 21 days.

The state or territory health official contacts each of the close contacts identified in the uploaded COVIDSafe app data of the sick person. The close contacts are offered advice, next steps and directed to local health services where relevant.

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Freedom Of Information Act 1982
By The Department Of Health And Medical Research

Data experience



App operation

App downloaded and users register themselves.

Contact records are generated and stored securely in the app and purged on a 21-day rolling cycle.

Note: digital handshakes of each contact will include the encrypted mobile number and proximity of the other contact

Note: No data leaves the phone until the user initiates an upload after a positive test.

COVID Safe National data storage system

Authorised health officials within each state and territory will be provided with relevant access to data for contact tracing purposes.

The data will be destroyed at the end of the pandemic.



CORONAVIRUS CONTACT APP FAQs

This Q&A provides details about the coronavirus contact app that has been developed to support our health response to the virus. The app has been created solely as a public health initiative and will allow state and territory health professionals to automate and improve what is already done manually.

Why does Australia need a contact app?

- The app will help keep you, your family and your community safe from further spread of coronavirus through early notification of possible exposure
- It will be one of the tools we will use to help protect the health of the community by quickly alerting people who may be at risk of having contact with the virus.
- Use of the app will allow us to move more quickly to reduce restrictions than would otherwise be possible.

What will the app do?

- The contact app will allow health professionals to tell you if you have come into close contact with someone who is diagnosed with Coronavirus.
- If you become infected with Coronavirus, the app will assist health professionals to notify people you have been in close contact with so they can self-isolate and get tested.
- This will speed up current processes and make it quicker to stop the spread of the virus, particularly if restrictions are eased.
- The app operates on a person's phone as they go about their daily business.
- It securely logs the encrypted hash codes of devices of other people who are using the app who have been in close contact with you.
- The close contact information is only able to be accessed by relevant health professionals if there has been a positive case to help alert those who may need to be tested.

Why should I use the contact app?

- Receiving early notification that you may have been exposed to Coronavirus means you can be tested or go into self-isolation so your health and those of others is protected.
- Without the assistance of technology, finding people who may have been exposed to the virus relies on people being able to recall who they have been around and knowing the details of every individual they have been in close contact with. In many cases, we don't know the names and contact details of those we've been in close contact with (for example, at the supermarket).
- The contact app uses technology to make this process faster and more accurate.
- The contact app has been developed to ensure your information and privacy is strictly protected.

Do I have to use the contact app?

- No. Its use is entirely voluntary, but using it will help save lives.
- For the App to work, it must be running in the background on your phone.

- You can delete the app from your phone at any time. This will delete all the app information from your phone.
- At the end of the Australian pandemic, users will be prompted to delete the app from their phone. This will delete all app information on a person's phone. The information contained on the highly restricted, secure information storage system will also be destroyed at the end of the pandemic.

How will the contact app work?

- A user voluntarily downloads the app from the app store. The user registers to use the app by entering their name, age range, phone number and postcode and will receive a confirmation SMS text message to complete the installation of the app. On the basis of this information, an encrypted hash code is generated for the app on that phone.
- The app uses Bluetooth to look for other devices that have the app installed. It takes a note of the contact when it occurs, securely logging the other users encrypted hash code. The date and time, distance and duration of the contact occurred are generated on the user's phone and also recorded. The location is not recorded.
- This information is securely encrypted and stored on the phone.
- The app uses a rolling 21 day window to allow for the maximum 14 day incubation period, and the time taken to confirm a positive test result. The rolling 21 day window allows the app to continuously monitor only those user contacts that occur during the Coronavirus incubation window. Contacts that occurred outside of the 21 day window are automatically deleted from the user's phone.
- The contact information on the phone is not accessible by anyone, until the user is diagnosed with Coronavirus and they upload the contact information to a highly restricted, secure information storage system.
- The uploaded information enables state or territory health officials to contact the user and close contacts to provide advice on actions they should take to manage their health status.
- This cycle continues if a user of the app who was a close contact subsequently tests positive.

If a user receives a close contact notification, will they be advised who the contact was?

- No. This will operate in the same way as existing contact processes run by State and Territory health professionals.
- A phone call will be made to users who have had close contact with another user once that user is independently confirmed as having the Coronavirus virus. This phone call will be made by a State or Territory health official.
- Close contact information is only available to State and Territory health officials once a user is confirmed as Coronavirus positive, and the user agrees to securely upload the information stored on their phone.
- These calls will only be made to close contacts that have occurred in the 21 days before the information has been uploaded. This early notification allows users to quickly self-isolate and/or seek medical attention.

Who is a "close contact" for notification purposes?

- A close contact is someone (another app user) who has been within approximately 1.5 metres of the infected user for 15 minutes or more.

How does the app know a "close contact" has occurred?

- When two (or more) app users come into close proximity their phones exchange Bluetooth signals and make a series of 'digital handshakes'.
- The app records the encrypted hash# code, time and proximity of two users, through the strength of the Bluetooth signals. This allows the approximate distance between the users and the duration the contact occurred to be determined once the data is uploaded to the highly restricted secure information storage system.
- The proximity for a close contact is approximately 1.5 metres, for a period of 15 minutes or more.
- To be effective, users should have the app running whenever they go about their daily business where they are coming into contact with people. Users of the app will receive daily notifications to ensure the app is running.

Why does the app only notify close contacts in the last 21 days?

- The average incubation period for someone who contracts the Coronavirus is typically 5 to 6 days, however the World Health Organization (WHO) currently estimate that the incubation period can be up to 14 days.
- The app uses a rolling 21 day window to allow for the maximum 14 day incubation period, and the time taken to confirm a positive test result.
- The rolling 21 day window allows the app to continuously monitor only those user contacts that occur during the Coronavirus incubation window.
- Contacts that occurred outside of the 21 day window are automatically deleted from the user's phone.

Is there a risk that people may report false positives?

- Information collected by the app that is uploaded to the highly restricted information storage system will only be accessed by state and territory health officials once a user has a positive diagnosis. This positive diagnosis must be verified by health professionals.

What information is captured by the contact app?

- The app only uses the information that's needed to alert close contacts and allow health officials to make contact with them.
- This information is only the encrypted hash code, date, time, duration and proximity of contacts.
- At registration, the user provides their name, age range, phone number and postcode, which generates an encrypted code.
- All information collected by the app is encrypted and stored within the app on the phone. Users cannot access contact information stored on their phone.
- If the user deletes the app, all contact information is deleted.
- The contact information on the phone is not accessible by anyone, unless the user is diagnosed with Coronavirus and they upload the contact information to a highly restricted secure information storage system.

Can the app be used to track a user or contact?

- No. It does not record an individual's location or movements. The app only records that a close contact occurred to allow health officials to contact those users to enable them to quickly self-isolate and/or seek medical attention.
- The App cannot be used to enforce quarantine or isolation restrictions or any other laws.

- Commonwealth and state/territory law enforcement agencies will not be allowed to access any information from the app.

Why does the app ask for your mobile phone number?

- A mobile number is needed to activate an account and to allow health officials to contact you if they need to.

Can a user or health official view the information stored on the phone including the contact log?

- No. All information that is stored on the phone is digitally encrypted and cannot be accessed or viewed by any users or health officials.
- Contact information older than 21 days on your phone is automatically deleted.

How will the information be stored?

- When a person registers the app their name, verified mobile number, age range and postcode are registered and encrypted on the highly restricted information storage system. They are provided an encoded hash code, which is the only data shared as part of the Bluetooth 'digital handshake'.
- The digital handshakes collected by the contact app are stored locally on the user's phone.
- Contact information only leaves the users phone if the user is diagnosed as having Coronavirus.
- Contacts that are older than 21 days are automatically deleted from the phone.
- The information is uploaded to a highly restricted secure information storage system . Only authorised state and territory health professionals will have access to the uploaded information. State and territory health officials will only have access to contact information for their state or territory.
- In accessing and using the uploaded data, health officials will be required to comply with the Australian Privacy Principles and all applicable data protection and information security obligations. It will only be able to be used for alerting individuals if they have come into contact with a person who has contracted Coronavirus.

How does this new app relate to the Australian Government Coronavirus App and WhatsApp service?

- The app is a separate, new app. Its sole purpose is to improve the ability of health professionals to quickly alert and contain virus outbreaks in the community.
- The Australian Government Coronavirus App and WhatsApp services are information services. They were developed to ensure the community has access to timely and accurate information about Coronavirus.

How does the contact app relate to other contact apps that have been released?

- This app is the only contact app that has been developed by the Health Department Australian Government to ensure your data and privacy are protected.
- Other contact apps do not have the support of the Australian Government.

How is my privacy going to be protected?

- The Health Minister has issued a Determination under the Biosecurity Act to protect people's privacy and restrict access to App data to state and territory health authorities for contact tracing.

- Other agencies, including law enforcement, will not be able to access the information.
- These provisions will be enshrined in legislation when Parliament returns in May.
- The app also has a range of privacy and security safeguards built in, including no collection of geolocation data and secure encryption.
- An independently developed Privacy Impact Assessment detailing the App's compliance with the Privacy Act and Australian Privacy Principles has been made publicly available. What data is being collected and what is not being collected?

Will legislation be required for the app to operate, or for individuals' privacy to be protected?

- No. Use of the App is voluntary.
- Collection and use of information from the App is consent based and consistent with the Privacy Act and Australian Privacy Principles.
- To further strengthen the Apps privacy arrangements the Health Minister made a Declaration under the Biosecurity Act to protect people's privacy and restrict access to App data to state and territory health authorities for contact tracing.
- These provisions will be enshrined in legislation when Parliament returns in May.

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**HOME AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY WRITTEN QUESTION ON NOTICE

Senate Select Committee COVID-19

QoN Number: IQ20-000031

Subject: COVID-19 Tracing App - lead authority

Asked by: Rex Patrick

Question:

Who does the Department understand to be the lead authority for the app? Please indicate if this has changed over time, and if so, why?

Answer:

The lead agencies for the COVIDSafe application are the Department of Health and Digital Transformation Agency (DTA).

Early development of a potential application was undertaken by the Department of Home Affairs, in collaboration with the Department of Health and the DTA.

The Department of Home Affairs undertook this work in support of the Department of Health and the DTA who were undertaking urgent work developing the Coronavirus Australia application and updating the australia.gov.au website.

On 3 April 2020, the Department of Home Affairs ceased all activity on the prototype design and handed all work over to the DTA, who developed the COVIDSafe application with the Department of Health.

The Department of Home Affairs had no further involvement in the design, development, procurement activities, or hosting of the COVIDSafe application.

Date Approved: 1 May 2020

SES Contact Officer: Greg Miller, First Assistant Secretary, s47F

Consultation: Digital Transformation Agency, Department of Health

Additional Clearance from: N/A

**HOME AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY WRITTEN QUESTION ON NOTICE

Senate Select Committee COVID-19

QoN Number: IQ20-000032

Subject: COVID-19 Tracing app - Department involvement

Asked by: Rex Patrick

Question:

What involvement has the Department (or its portfolio agencies) had in the design/development/procurement of the app?

Answer:

The lead agencies for the COVIDSafe application are the Department of Health and Digital Transformation Agency (DTA).

Early development of a potential application was undertaken by the Department of Home Affairs, in collaboration with the Department of Health and the DTA.

The Department of Home Affairs undertook this work in support of the Department of Health and the DTA who were undertaking urgent work developing the Coronavirus Australia application and updating the australia.gov.au website.

On 3 April 2020, the Department of Home Affairs ceased all activity on the prototype design and handed all work over to the DTA, who developed the COVIDSafe application with the Department of Health.

The Department of Home Affairs had no further involvement in the design, development, procurement activities, or hosting of the COVIDSafe application.

Date Approved: 1 May 2020
SES Contact Officer: Mathew Smorhun, Senior Assistant Secretary, §47F
Consultation: Digital Transformation Agency, Department of Health
Additional Clearance from: N/A

**HOME AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY WRITTEN QUESTION ON NOTICE

Senate Select Committee COVID-19

QoN Number: IQ20-000033

Subject: COVID-19 Tracing - Advice

Asked by: Rex Patrick

Question:

Which Government Departments/ Agency have provided the Department with advice relating to the app?

Answer:

The lead agencies for the COVIDSafe application are the Department of Health and Digital Transformation Agency (DTA).

Matters of advice relating to the COVIDSafe application should be directed to the Department of Health and the DTA.

Date Approved: 1 May 2020
SES Contact Officer: Mathew Smorhun, Senior Assistant Secretary, s47F
Consultation: Digital Transformation Agency, Department of Health, Australian Cyber Security Centre
Additional Clearance from: N/A

**HOME AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS**

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY WRITTEN QUESTION ON NOTICE

Senate Select Committee COVID-19

. **QoN Number:** IQ20-000034

Subject: COVID-19 Tracing app - Contracts

Asked by: Rex Patrick

Question:

What contracts has the Department let in relation to the application (including development/data storage etc.)? For each contract:

- a. When was the tender released?
- b. What procurement method was used?
- c. If a limited tender was used:
 - i. What was the reason for choosing a limited tender?
 - ii. What date was the tender issued?
 - iii. Which entities were invited to tender?
 - iv. How was clause 4.7 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules assessed?
 - v. On what date were the tender responses received?
 - vi. Which officials were involved in the decision to award a tender – please provide a name if the official was a member of the Senior Executive Service
 - vii. What date was the contract signed?
 - viii. What is the scope of work?
 - ix. What is the contract value?
 - x. What is the term of the contract?
- d. Does the contract award accord with Digital Transformation Agency and Government principles as enshrined in DTA's Whole-of-government Hosting Strategy"?

<https://www.dta.gov.au/our-projects/whole-government-hosting-strategy>)

Answer:

The Department of Home Affairs commenced procurement activities in relation to an early 'conceptual prototype' design. The following existing Whole-of-Government Panels and Standing Offers were used to engage three (3) vendors. Matters relating to the COVIDSafe procurement should be directed to the DTA.

Table 1 – Procurements Prototype Development

Name	Panel or Standing Offer	Value Ex GST
Amazon Web Services (AWS)	DTA AWS Whole of Government Arrangement – Standing Offer	\$164,995.64
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG)	DTA Digital Marketplace Whole of Government Panel – Standing Offer	\$220,000.00
CTO Group	Treasury Portfolio Panel – Standing Offer	\$31,200.00
TOTAL COST		\$416,195.64

- a. Not applicable as existing Whole-of-Government Panels and/or Standing Offers were used.
- b. Please refer to Table 1- Procurements Prototype Development (above).
- c. A limited tender was not used.
- d. Yes.

Date Approved: 1 May 2020
SES Contact Officer: Mathew Smorhun, Senior Assistant Secretary, s47F
Consultation: Digital Transformation Agency, Department of Health
Additional Clearance from: N/A

Senate Select Committee on COVID-19 Committee Membership Committee Members



Senator Katy Gallagher (Lab) Chair



Senator James Paterson (Lib), Dep Chair



Senator Perin Davey (Nationals)



Senator Kristina Keneally (Lab)



Senator Jacqui Lambie (JLN)



Senator Rachel Siewert (Greens)



Senator Murray Watt (Lab)

Participating Members

Senators Eric Abetz, Alex Antic, Wendy Askew, Tim Ayres, Catryna Bilyk, Andrew Bragg, Slade Brockman, Carol Brown, Matthew Canavan, Kim Carr, Claire Chandler, Anthony Chisholm, Raff Ciccone, Richard Di Natale, Patrick Dodson, Don Farrell, Mehreen Faruqi, David Fawcett, Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, Alex Gallacher, Nita Green, Stirling Griff, Sarah Hanson-Young, Sarah Henderson, Hollie Hughes, Kimberley Kitching, Sue Lines, Jenny McAllister, Malarndirri McCarthy, Susan McDonald, James McGrath, Bridget McKenzie, Nick McKim, Andrew McLachlan, Sam McMahon, Jim Molan, Deborah O'Neill, Matt O'Sullivan, Rex Patrick, Helen Polley, Louise Pratt, Gerard Rennick, Janet Rice, Malcolm Roberts, Paul Scarr, Tony Sheldon, Dean Smith, Marielle Smith, Jordon Steele-John, Glenn Sterle, Amanda Stoker, Anne Urquhart, David Van, Jess Walsh, Larissa Waters, Peter Whish-Wilson, Penny Wong

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THE SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON COVID-19


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PUBLIC HEARING
Wednesday 6 May 2020


Committee Room 2S1
Parliament House, Canberra

Time	Witness
1.00 pm	<p>Attorney-General's Department Ms Sarah Chidgey, Deputy Secretary, Integrity and International Group Ms Julia Galluccio, Assistant Secretary Mr Andrew Walter, First Assistant Secretary Ms Amy Jarvoll, Director</p> <p>Digital Transformation Agency Mr Randall Brugeaud, Chief Executive Officer Mr Peter Alexander, Chief Digital Officer Ms Joanne Hutchinson, Chief Portfolio Officer Mr Anthony Warnock, Head of Digital Infrastructure Service, Digital Delivery and Corporate Division</p> <p>Department of Health Ms Caroline Edwards, Acting Secretary Mr Daniel Keys, First Assistant Secretary Mr Paul McBride, First Assistant Secretary</p>
4.00 pm	<i>Adjournment</i>

Committee Chair: Senator Katy Gallagher
Committee Secretary: Jane Thomson
PO Box 6100, Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 Tel: 02 6277 3892 Fax: 02 6277 5706
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