Part 2: Performance Reporting2.3 Performance by Outcome
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Preparedness to respond to national health emergencies and risks, including through surveillance, regulation, prevention, detection and leadership in national health coordination.
1 Under the National Health Security Act 2007 an agent is defined as bacteria and viruses, and toxins derived from biological sources including animals, plants and microbes.
2 A novel virus is a virus that has never previously infected humans, or has not infected humans for a long time, and it is likely that almost no one in the population will have immunity, or antibody to protect them against the novel virus.
3 Available at www.who.int/ihr/en/index.html.
4 Accessible at www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-hlth-disaster-mngment-cap-audit-2008.
5 Surge capacity is the ability of healthcare systems to adequately care for large numbers of patients.
6 Further information available at www.health.gov.au/ssba.
7 The List of Security Sensitive Biological Agents is available at www.health.gov.au/ssba#list.
8 Available at www.daff.gov.au/quarantinebiosecurityreview/report_to_the_minister_for_agriculture_fisheries_and_forestry.
9 Available at www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/eh19syn.htm.
10 Available at www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-environ-envstrat.htm.
| Qualitative Deliverable: | Regular stakeholder participation in program development through a range of avenues such as surveys, conferences, meetings and submissions on departmental discussion papers. | |
| Result: Deliverable met. | ||
| Relevant stakeholders across all sectors, including other Australian Government agencies, states and territories, industry, academic and research institutions, and expert bodies were consulted on policy and program development matters as appropriate. As an example, the department was the diamond sponsor of the Environmental Health Australia’s 35th National Environmental Health Conference Towards Sustainability – time to deliver, held in November 2009. This conference provided a key opportunity to discuss environmental health workforce issues directly with environmental health practitioners, academics, government representatives and other key stakeholders. | ||
| National Health Emergency Response Management | ||
|---|---|---|
| Qualitative Deliverable: | Policy and operational matters relating to pandemic preparedness, potential bioterrorism and mass casualty incidents are addressed through consultation with other Australian Government agencies, the jurisdictions, and experts through key committees and working groups. This will be measured by the department’s participation in regular meetings of the Australian Health Protection Committee and its sub-committees. | |
| Result: Deliverable substantially met. | ||
| The Australian Health Protection Committee held six face-to-face meetings, and 56 teleconferences during 2009-10 to consider significant policy and operational matters related to pandemic preparedness, potential bioterrorism and mass casualty incidents. The committee was supported in its work by three subcommittees and one working group. A primary focus of activities was the management and coordination of the national response to the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009. The committee also contributed to whole-of-government elements of the pandemic response through participation in the National Pandemic Emergency Committee, a committee chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Throughout the pandemic response, the committee also consulted with the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation, the General Practice Roundtable, and other expert groups and experts. The Health All Hazards Working Group of the committee undertook a substantial amount of work to ensure a nationally coordinated response during a health emergency. This included consideration of National Health Emergency Response Arrangements (NatHealth Arrangements), a national mass trauma plan (AUSTRAUMAPLAN) and other planning and preparedness activities. The national policy coordination function of this committee had a substantial impact on the health and wellbeing of the Australian community. |
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| Qualitative Deliverable: | Goods in the National Medical Stockpile are replaced as they expire. This will be measured by replacement items being delivered to the National Medical Stockpile as close to the items’ expiry date as possible. | |
| Result: Deliverable met. | ||
| In 2009-10, expiring items held in the National Medical Stockpile were replaced as close to their expiry dates as possible. Due to production and delivery delays, some items arrived later than the department required. The response capability of the stockpile was not affected at any time. | ||
| Biosecurity, Drug and Chemical Safety, and Environmental Health | ||
| Qualitative Deliverable: | Enhanced national approaches to environmental health hazards are developed. This will be measured by progress against the key performance indicators in the National Environmental Health Strategy. | |
| Result: Deliverable met. | ||
| Progress was made against all of the key performance indicators contained in the National Environmental Health Strategy 2007-2012. In particular, significant gains have been made in the areas of workforce development and support; the development of evidence-based, effective and nationally consistent guidance that supports the protection of public health; and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander environmental health. | ||
| Quantitative Deliverable: | Percentage of variance between actual and budgeted expenses. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | ≤0.5% | 2009-10 Actual: | 1.8% |
| Result: Deliverable not met. | |||
| This overspend was due to a higher than anticipated write down and deployment of assets in the National Medical Stockpile. | |||
| Integrate and Coordinate Arrangements to Protect the Australian Community | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Quantitative Deliverable: | Number of Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza annexes produced. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 4 | 2009-10 Actual: | 1 |
| Result: Deliverable not met. | |||
| Due to the need to focus on the development of documents to assist the health sector to respond to pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009, completion of outstanding annexes to the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza was put on hold. During the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009 response, a new annex to the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza was developed - the PROTECT phase annex. This annex was developed to support the new policies developed during the response which particularly focused on protecting those most vulnerable to severe outcomes. An Indigenous appendix to the PROTECT annex was also developed to clearly outline specific issues for Indigenous Australians with underlying medical conditions or in remote communities. To guide implementation of the largest vaccination program in Australia, a vaccination appendix to the PROTECT annex was also developed. This appendix included the guidelines on multi-dose vial use, priority groups for vaccination and administration guidelines for general practitioners and other immunisation providers. Lessons identified during the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009 will inform an assessment of what further annexes and supporting documentation are necessary to enhance future response capability. |
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| Integrate and Coordinate Arrangements to Protect the Australian Community | |||
| Quantitative Deliverable: | Percentage of H1N1 Panvax vaccine produced and distributed to jurisdictions in a timely manner. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 100% | 2009-10 Actual: | 100%11 |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |||
| The department’s order for 21 million doses of Panvax H1N1 vaccine from CSL Limited was produced on time with the final batches produced and distributed in January 2010. All Panvax H1N1 vaccine doses required by jurisdictions and immunisation providers were distributed through the existing National Immunisation Program networks immediately upon receiving a request for vaccine supply. | |||
| Biosecurity, Drug and Chemical Safety, and Environmental Health | |||
| Quantitative Deliverable: | Percentage of applications for the import/export/manufacture of controlled substances that are assessed within agreed timeframes. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 98% | 2009-10 Actual: | 99% |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |||
| The department granted a total of 5,617 permits and 738 licences authorising the import and export of controlled drugs, and four licences for the manufacture of controlled drugs. Ninety nine per cent of licences and permits were issued within timeframes which range from 24 hours, for urgent medical needs, up to six weeks. More than three million legitimate movements of controlled drugs between establishments were monitored and reported to state and territory health agencies within agreed timeframes. |
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| Integrate and Coordinate Arrangements to Protect the Australian Community | |
|---|---|
| Qualitative Indicator: | The extent to which the Australian Government, through the department, is prepared to respond to disease outbreaks or mass casualty incidents. This will be measured by the Government’s performance in exercises and possession of sufficient resources for deployment. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| The department was involved in a series of three discussion exercises to support the development of the Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre and contributed to preparatory work for Multi-Jurisdictional Exercise (MJEX) Mercury 10, expected to be held in August 2010. The response to pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009 was a real-time test of the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza planning framework and the deployment of antivirals, personal protective equipment and vaccination equipment from the National Medical Stockpile. | |
| Qualitative Indicator: | Containment of disease outbreaks, mass casualty and biosecurity incidents through the timely engagement of national health coordination mechanisms and response plans; and the capacity for the timely deployment of the National Medical Stockpile. The success of this indicator will be measured by the impact of a disease outbreak, mass casualty or biosecurity incident mitigated, if it occurs; and the deployment of the stockpile, either through exercise or live deployment, meeting the six-hour response benchmark. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| The Australian Health Protection Committee continued to manage the national response to the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009 by implementing the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza. The department’s National Incident Room continued to provide a focal point for the national response. The development of the new PROTECT phase, under the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza, guided the management of this new disease, which was mild in most people, severe in some, and moderate overall. Deployment of National Medical Stockpile goods, such as antivirals, personal protective equipment and vaccination equipment provided effective support to Australians in responding to the threat posed by the pandemic. During the pandemic response, the department distributed antiviral medications and personal protective equipment to jurisdictions within agreed timeframes. However, there was some confusion within the states and territories on responsibility within the jurisdictions for further distribution of National Medical Stockpile goods. Although at the peak of the pandemic there was significant impact on Intensive Care wards and hospital resources, these were managed in line with planned strategies, such as some deferral of elective surgery and more extensive usage of high dependency units particularly at the height of the pandemic. Health departments across Australia also implemented measures, such as specialist influenza services including home care programs and influenza clinics, and re-organised hospital and other health services to reduce demand on the health system. The department also, through the National Incident Room, coordinated the dispatch of medical teams to Samoa following the tsunamigenic earthquake in the South Western Pacific Ocean on 29 September 2009. |
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| Biosecurity, Drug and Chemical Safety, and Environmental Health | |
| Qualitative Indicator: | The access to biological agents for terrorist purposes is limited. This will be measured by the registration of facilities working with identified security sensitive biological agents, their compliance with mandatory standards; and the department’s successful engagement with industry. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| In 2009-10, inspections commenced on facilities regulated under the Security Sensitive Biological Agents Regulatory Scheme. At 30 June 2010, nine registered facilities had been inspected. The inspection scheme was well received and no major non-compliances were identified. The department ran workshops for regulated facilities in July-August 2009, November-December 2009 and in June 2010, to provide further training, education and awareness-raising for laboratories that are regulated under the Security Sensitive Biological Agents Regulatory Scheme. The department provided further outreach through the provision of a website12 with supporting guidance material, and issued quarterly newsletters. |
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| Qualitative Indicator: | Human health and the environment are protected from harmful chemicals and drugs. This will be measured by the department’s timeliness, quality, and stakeholder acceptance of chemical assessments, setting standards and issuing authorisations. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| The department completed 137 chemical assessments and supported approval or registration of chemicals only if they did not pose a hazard to human safety or would not have a harmful effect on humans. Six unsuccessful applicants submitted additional data on their chemicals. These were evaluated and in four cases the original recommendations were not changed. Appropriate acceptable daily intakes, acute reference doses, first aid instructions, safety directions, and re-entry and warning statements were recommended when approval or registration was supported by the department. Existing chemicals are reviewed if new information of safety concern becomes available. Several significant reviews were completed noting that timeframes were agreed with the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority taking into account the complexity of the assessment. The department also provided advice on atrazine and dioxin, as well as on several other agricultural and veterinary chemicals and impurities of concern. |
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11 Figure based on the amount of vaccine produced and the distribution of requested vaccines.
12 Accessible at www.health.gov.au/ssba.
| Integrate and Coordinate Arrangements to protect the Australian Community | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Quantitative Indicator: | Percentage of facilities which are working with identified security sensitive biological agents that are registered and compliant with mandatory standards. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 100% | 2009-10 Actual: | 100% |
| Result: Indicator met. | |||
| In 2009-10, 100 per cent of facilities handling security sensitive biological agents were registered. | |||
| Quantitative Indicator: | Percentage of H1N1 Panvax vaccinations taken up by the community. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 50% | 2009-10 Actual: | Unknown13 |
| Result: Indicator substantially met. | |||
| The Australian Government ordered 21 million doses of vaccine at a time when it was anticipated that two doses of vaccine would be required to provide sufficient immunity against pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009. The initial order was intended to cover 10.5 million people (about 50 per cent of the population), including those most at risk of severe outcomes from influenza, and a sufficient amount for the population to control the spread of infection. In September 2009, as part of the Therapeutic Goods Administration’s registration of the vaccine, the department was provided confirmation that adults would only require one dose. As at 30 June 2010, 9.12 million doses had been distributed to immunisation providers across the country. |
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| Biosecurity, Drug and Chemical Safety, and Environmental Health | |||
| Quantitative Indicator: | Percentage of evaluations of the human health aspects of applications to approve or register pesticides and veterinary medicines that are made within agreed timeframes and pass performance standards assessment. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 100% | 2009-10 Actual: | 37% |
| Result: Indicator not met. | |||
| In 2007-08 and 2008-09, 100 per cent of evaluations were completed within agreed timeframes. Due to resourcing and infrastructure, only 24 per cent of the evaluations completed in the first half of 2009-10 were within agreed timeframes. To provide timely evaluations, other work was re-prioritised to divert additional resources to registration evaluations. In the second half of 2009-10, 48 per cent of evaluations were completed within the timeframe. The department expects to meet its target shortly after commencement of the 2010-11 financial year. Additional staff will be recruited to ensure the department’s targets are met in 2010-11. In terms of review work, 95 per cent was completed on time. In the remaining cases, extensions of time were obtained. |
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| Quantitative Indicator: | Percentage of recommendations for standards relating to the supply of human medicines, pesticides, veterinary medicines and other chemicals that are made within statutory timeframes. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 100% | 2009-10 Actual: | 100% |
| Result: Indicator met. | |||
| All scheduling recommendations made for the Standard for the Uniform Scheduling of Drugs and Poisons by the National Drugs and Poisons Scheduling Committee were provided within acceptable timeframes. In 2009-10, the National Drugs and Poisons Scheduling Committee secretariat received 172 applications for scheduling, gazetted 106 substances (or item related entries), received 289 public submissions and processed 227 pieces of post-meeting correspondence. |
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13 While it is not known how many distributed doses have been administered, distribution approximates the original target of pandemic (H1N1) vaccine coverage for 10.5 million Australians given only a single dose was required for protection.
14 Number of new cases of infection or disease within a specified period of time.
15 Total number of cases of an infection or disease in a population at a given time.
16 Departments including the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AusAID, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, and the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
17 Available at www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/cda-about.htm.
| Qualitative Deliverable: | Timely production and dissemination of accurate communicable disease surveillance data, reports and public health resources and guidelines. This will be measured by the department’s production and dissemination of reports and guidelines. |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |
| In 2009-10, the department produced and disseminated accurate communicable disease surveillance data, reports and public health resources. Data, transmitted on a daily basis from the state and territory health departments was incorporated into a national data warehouse managed by the department. Using the data, the department reported national notifiable diseases data fortnightly to the Communicable Diseases Network Australia so that outbreaks and trends in disease notifications were identified and acted upon by jurisdictions. Data were also summarised and published on the department’s website. Annual data were summarised and reported in the publication Communicable Diseases Intelligence. |
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| Qualitative Deliverable: | Regular stakeholder participation in program development through a range of avenues such as surveys, conferences, meetings and submissions on departmental discussion papers. |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |
| The department fostered and strengthened communicable disease surveillance partnerships through the Australian Health Protection Committee and its subcommittees, in particular the Communicable Disease Network Australia and the Public Health Laboratory Network. During the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009, the department worked closely with these committees on a daily basis, developing policy and implementing actions. The quality of communicable disease data was maintained through state and territory participation in the National Surveillance Committee and the Case Definitions Working Group. Regular meetings and liaison ensured data quality and timeliness, and that nationally agreed case definitions were used by all jurisdictions for consistent notification of cases. Upgrades to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System were made with collaborative input from state and territory health departments. |
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| Communicable Disease Surveillance, Analysis and Reporting | |
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| Qualitative Deliverable: | Surveillance data informs the development of preparedness strategies. This will be measured by the department’s performance in providing necessary data to strategy developers. |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |
| In response to the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009, the department made numerous enhancements to the Biosecurity Surveillance System and the Syndromic Surveillance System. These changes resulted in the collection of additional data from a range of new sources including hospital intensive care units and emergency departments. The department and national committees used the data extensively to plan Australia’s response to the pandemic and develop strategies for responding to future pandemics. |
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| Qualitative Deliverable: | Surveillance data triggers/prompts appropriate health protection responses. This will be measured by the timely communication of surveillance data to policy development and response planning areas, and decision-makers and expert bodies for further consideration. |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |
| In 2009-10, the department worked very closely with the Australian Health Protection Committee and its subcommittee the Communicable Diseases Network Australia to assess surveillance data three times a day as part of the response to the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009. The data, which included information on influenza cases from hospitals, laboratories and public health units, as well as information from the National Health Call Centre Network, was shared with expert committees on a daily basis. In addition, the department supplies surveillance data and in turn worked with the states and territories through the Communicable Diseases Network Australia, to action and contain all communicable disease outbreaks including outbreaks of tuberculosis, measles, pertussis (whooping cough) and dengue fever. This involved contact tracing of potentially infected individuals to limit the spread of communicable diseases in Australia. A further example of the department’s action in this area is working with OzFoodNet to provide advice to the World Health Organization regarding an outbreak of hepatitis A caused by contaminated sun-dried tomatoes. |
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| Minimising Risks Posed by Communicable Diseases | |
| Qualitative Deliverable: | Improved communication and coordination between Queensland Health and the Papua New Guinea Government to address cross-border health issues to reduce the spread of communicable diseases into the Torres Strait and further to mainland Australia. This will be measured by increased data sharing between Queensland Health and Papua New Guinea health services about the care that Papua New Guinea nationals receive in Australia. |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |
| The department, through the Torres Strait Cross-Border Health Issues Committee, improved communication and coordination between Queensland Health and the Papua New Guinea Government to address cross-border health issues to reduce the spread of communicable diseases into the Torres Strait Islands and further to mainland Australia. In particular, communication networks were established with health staff in Western Province Treaty villages and Daru General Hospital and an arrangement for sharing of data on communicable diseases in Papua New Guinea (such as tuberculosis, malaria and sexually transmitted infections including HIV) was put in place to enable surveillance and follow up of Papua New Guinea patients initially diagnosed or treated in Queensland health facilities. |
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| Qualitative Deliverable: | Participation in relevant national and international communicable disease preparedness and response forums. This will be measured by the level of departmental participation in appropriate forums. |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |
| The department continued active participation in a number of surveillance fora with other Australian government departments including the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, AusAID and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, presented to visiting international delegations, and attended relevant international conferences. As an example, the department prepared a paper for presentation to the 4th East Asia Summit Leaders Briefing. | |
| Quantitative Deliverable: | Percentage of variance between actual and budgeted expenses. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | ≤0.5% | 2009-10 Actual: | -14.1% |
| Result: Deliverable not met. | |||
| Delays in the negotiation and finalisation of a number of funding agreements due to competing priorities and technical impediments contributed to this underspend. | |||
| Communicable Disease Surveillance, Analysis and Reporting | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Quantitative Deliverable: | Number of meetings with key advisory committees such as the Communicable Disease Network Australia, its subcommittees and other expert advisory bodies. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 52 | 2009-10 Actual: | 108 |
| Result: Deliverable met. | |||
| The department provides coordination, facilitation and secretariat support for the Australian Health Protection Committee and its subcommittees. The department is an active member of all the committees and provides the Chair for the Australian Health Protection Committee and a co-chair for the Health All Hazards Working Group. The department enables input to the Australian Health Protection Committee and its subcommittees from other government departments and external stakeholders. Policy and program areas within the department contribute expertise, with the majority of issues considered by the Australian Health Protection Committee originating from the department. The Environmental Health Subcommittee (enHealth) and its subcommittees held 18 teleconferences and eight face-to-face meetings. The Communicable Diseases Network Australia held 65 teleconferences and three face-to-face meetings. The Public Health Laboratory Network held nine teleconferences and one face-to-face meeting. The Health All Hazards Working Group held two teleconferences and two face-to-face meetings. In the context of pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009, the department led and contributed to an extensive number of meetings with the Communicable Diseases Network Australia and the Public Health Laboratory Network, which enabled the development of national guidelines for the public health response, agreed by all jurisdictions. |
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| Communicable Disease Surveillance, Analysis and Reporting | |
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| Qualitative Indicator: | Effective surveillance, analysis and management of domestic and international incidents and outbreaks of communicable and foodborne diseases. This will be measured through the reporting of such incidents and outbreaks within agreed protocols and timeframes. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| In 2009-10, the department conducted national surveillance on 65 notifiable diseases through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. While the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009 was the greatest communicable disease threat to population health in 2009-10, cases of measles, meningococcal diseases and dengue fever were managed in collaboration with state and territory health authorities. In 2009-10, the department, through OzFoodNet, investigated 46 multi-jurisdictional diseases and outbreaks, including Salmonella Litchfield, hepatitis A, Bonsoy iodine and two separate outbreaks of listeriosis. The department responded to 121 requests for information or data regarding nationally notifiable communicable diseases. Multiple enhancements to surveillance systems simplified reporting of national notifiable diseases, outbreaks and influenza-like illness in Australia. Four quarterly reports of Communicable Disease Intelligence were also released in 2009-10.18 |
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| Qualitative Indicator: | The impact of communicable and foodborne disease is reduced. This will be measured by medium and long-term trend analysis of the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System and OzFoodNet data. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| In 2009-10, the department analysed a range of data sources including information on the 65 diseases collected by the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, OzFoodNet data and hospital intensive care data. The pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009 resulted in a significant increase in the number of influenza cases reported in 2009-10 compared with the annual average. This reflects both the increased numbers of cases due to the pandemic but also increased surveillance, awareness and testing. While the number of reported cases of communicable diseases have tended to increase in recent years due to better case finding and more complete follow-up, there are some diseases for which there has been a measurable decline in incidence due to public health interventions which are based on surveillance data. Between 1991 and 2000, there was an average of 1,974 cases of hepatitis A per year, declining to an average of 274 cases per year between 2003 and 2008, with an increasing proportion of these being acquired overseas. In 2009-10, there was a large outbreak of hepatitis A (433 locally-acquired cases) detected through analysis of surveillance data. The department worked with other Australian Government agencies, jurisdictional and expert partners through the Communicable Diseases Network Australia and its subcommittees, to reduce the impact of communicable and foodborne diseases. |
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| Qualitative Indicator: | Strengthened national and international expert networks to enhance Australia’s preparedness and health protection response in the global health environment. This will be measured by the extent of collaborative partnerships with state and territory public health units and experts. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| In 2009-10, the department strengthened its national networks by working with Australian Government agencies, jurisdictional and expert partners through the Communicable Diseases Network Australia and its subcommittees. Fortnightly teleconferences with the Communicable Diseases Network Australia allowed timely information sharing and response to outbreaks of communicable disease. During the height of the pandemic (H1N1) influenza 2009, teleconferences were convened daily to assess surveillance information and develop strategies to minimise the risk of disease transmission and its impact. The department also strengthened its relationship with Australian Government agencies including AusAID and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as well as international organisations including the World Health Organization and its relevant bodies. In 2009-10, the department, through OzFoodNet, investigated four multi-jurisdictional outbreaks of foodborne disease; hepatitis A; listeriosis; salmonellosis; and thyroid dysfunction due to excess iodine intake. During the large multi-jurisdictional outbreak of hepatitis A in Australia in 2009-10, strengthened national and international partnerships were essential to identifying the food vehicle (semi-dried tomatoes) and minimising the impact of the outbreak. The department, through OzFoodNet managed the epidemiological investigation nationally, in partnership with the state and territory health departments (responsible for managing food recalls and environmental investigation) and Food Standards Australia New Zealand (responsible for coordinating national food recalls). During this outbreak, the department’s communication of investigation findings through international networks (the World Health Organization INFOSAN, professional networks and a notification under the International Health Regulations 2005) led to local health authorities detecting outbreaks associated with to the same food product in France and the Netherlands. |
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| Minimising Risks Posed by Communicable Diseases | |
| Qualitative Indicator: | Improved communication and surveillance between Australia and Papua New Guinea. This will be measured by the extent to which communication and disease monitoring arrangements can be established and maintained between Australia and Papua New Guinea through funding agreement communication protocols and regular data reporting. |
| Result: Indicator met. | |
| The department, through the Torres Strait Cross-Border Health Issues Committee, improved communication and surveillance between Australia and Papua New Guinea, particularly in relation to tuberculosis and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis. A tuberculosis communication protocol was established for the follow up of, and referral to, Papua New Guinea of its nationals diagnosed with tuberculosis in the Torres Strait islands to monitor treatment compliance and minimise the spread of this communicable disease in the islands. Also, a database containing information about Papua New Guinea nationals initially diagnosed or receiving care in Queensland health facilities was provided quarterly to the Western Province Health Administration for patient follow up and tracing of chest clinic review defaulters. Papua New Guinea’s telecommunication infrastructure and limitations to health capacity and resources, particularly in Western Province, posed challenges to the reciprocal flow of information and data sharing between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Under a funding arrangement with AusAID, the department worked with Queensland Health to implement a high frequency radio and telephone interconnect system to provide a more reliable means for cross-border communication and to enable timely follow up of patients in Papua New Guinea and ensure treatment compliance. The department, through the Health Issues Committee, will continue to engage with Papua New Guinea to facilitate strengthening of health service capacity in Western Province and build a stronger basis for collaboration with the Papua New Guinea Government including Western Province Health Administration. |
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18 Accessible at www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/cda-pubs-cdi-cdiintro.htm.
| Communicable Diseases Surveillance, Analysis and Reporting | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Quantitative Indicator: | Percentage of nationally notifiable diseases reported to the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, as measured by the success of daily monitoring. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 100% | 2009-10 Actual: | 100% |
| Result: Indicator met. | |||
| In 2009-10, all notifiable data contributed by state and territory health authorities were recorded in the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System. | |||
| Quantitative Indicator: | Percentage of data completeness for non-mandatory data fields (date of birth, sex, Indigenous status, death, serogroup/subtype) for select key indicators (tuberculosis, invasive pneumococcal disease, and meningococcal) for which enhanced data is collected. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 80% | 2009-10 Actual: | 93% |
| Result: Indicator met. | |||
| In 2009-10, the data for non-mandatory data fields for selected key indicators (tuberculosis, invasive pneumococcal disease and meningococcal disease) forwarded by states and territories were 93 per cent complete, well above the 2009-10 target. | |||
| Quantitative Indicator: | Percentage of communicable disease surveillance reports completed and disseminated according to schedule. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 100% | 2009-10 Actual: | 100% |
| Result: Indicator met. | |||
| In 2009-10, all communicable disease surveillance reports were completed and disseminated according to the scheduled timeframes. These included fortnightly domestic and international surveillance reports completed as scheduled for members of the Communicable Diseases Network Australia. | |||
| Minimising Risks Posed by Communicable Diseases | |||
| Quantitative Indicator: | Number of regular reports to Australian committees on cross-border activities within the Treaty Zone and improvements on communication links between Australia and Papua New Guinea. | ||
| 2009-10 Target: | 4 | 2009-10 Actual: | 4 |
| Result: Indicator met. | |||
| Two progress reports with information on cross-border communication, Papua New Guinea patients statistics and an update on Queensland Health’s progress in developing a framework for common approaches to communicable disease prevention, control and management within the Torres Strait Treaty Zone, were provided to the Health Issues Committee at the September 2009 and April 2010 meetings. The department provided comprehensive reports on cross-border activities to address cross-border health concerns in the Treaty Zone to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Joint Advisory Council (a bilateral forum established to oversee the implementation of the Torres Strait Treaty) in November 2009. The department also reported to two Inter-Departmental Committee meetings on the Torres Strait Treaty in September 2009 and April 2010. |
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| (A) Budget Estimate 2009-10 $’000 |
(B) Actual 2009-10 $’000 |
Variation (Column B minus Column A) $’000 |
Budget Estimate 2010-11 $’000 |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
| Program 14.1: Health Emergency Planning and Response | ||||
| Administered Expenses | ||||
| Ordinary Annual Services (Annual Appropriation Bill 1) | 42,210 | 41,175 | ( 1,035) | 22,973 |
| Non cash expenses – write down of assets | 81,113 | 84,348 | 3,235 | 103,573 |
| Special accounts | ||||
| Human Pituitory Hormones Special Account | 100 | 160 | 60 | 120 |
| Departmental Expenses | ||||
| Ordinary Annual Services (Annual Appropriation Bill 1) | 23,883 | 21,742 | ( 2,141) | 19,444 |
| Revenues from other sources | 2,495 | 2,279 | ( 216) | 2,411 |
| Unfunded depreciation expense1 | - | - | - | 985 |
| Operating loss / (surplus) | - | 12 | 12 | - |
| Total for Program 14.1 | 149,801 | 149,716 | ( 85) | 149,506 |
| Program 14.2: Surveillance | ||||
| Administered Expenses | ||||
| Ordinary Annual Services (Annual Appropriation Bill 1) | 6,833 | 5,868 | ( 965) | 3,868 |
| Departmental Expenses | ||||
| Ordinary Annual Services (Annual Appropriation Bill 1) | 10,167 | 10,061 | ( 106) | 8,277 |
| Revenues from other sources | 1,062 | 1,054 | ( 8) | 1,026 |
| Unfunded depreciation expense1 | - | - | - | 419 |
| Operating loss / (surplus) | - | 6 | 6 | - |
| Total for Program 14.2 | 18,062 | 16,989 | ( 1,073) | 13,590 |
| Outcome 14 Totals by appropriation type | ||||
| Administered Expenses | ||||
| Ordinary Annual Services (Annual Appropriation Bill 1) | 49,043 | 47,043 | ( 2,000) | 26,841 |
| Non cash expenses | 81,113 | 84,348 | 3,235 | 103,573 |
| Special accounts | 100 | 160 | 60 | 120 |
| Departmental Expenses | ||||
| Ordinary Annual Services (Annual Appropriation Bill 1) | 34,050 | 31,803 | ( 2,247) | 27,721 |
| Revenues from other sources | 3,557 | 3,333 | ( 224) | 3,437 |
| Unfunded depreciation expense1 | - | - | - | 1,404 |
| Operating loss / (surplus) | - | 18 | 18 | - |
| Total Expenses for Outcome 14 | 167,863 | 166,705 | ( 1,158) | 163,096 |
| Average Staffing Level (Number) | 255 | 239 | ( 16) | 229 |
1Reflects the change to net cash appropriation framework implemented from 2010-11.
Produced by the Portfolio Strategies Division, Australian
Government Department of Health and Ageing.
URL: http://www.health.gov.au/internet/annrpt/publishing.nsf/Content/annual-report-0910-toc~0910-2~0910-2-3~0910-2-3-14
If you would like to know more or give us your comments contact: annrep@health.gov.au
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